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THE OPINIONS OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
FOR THE 1934 TERM-GENERAL ISSUES
OSMOND K. FRAENKELt
T HE Supreme Court is concerned not only with problems of consti-
tutional interpretation but also with the interpretation of federal
statutes and, occasionally, with the determination of questions of ordinary
law. Most of these cases arise on appeals from federal courts, some of
them, however, on appeal from the decisions of state courts. Naturally,
the Supreme Court is also cqncerned with problems of federal practice.
Criminal Law
The conception of fair trial, at least for the federal system, has now
been extended so as to be the same in criminal as in civil cases1 and a
conviction has been reversed because of improper summation.2 In dis-
tinguished terms Justice Sutherland defined the duties of the prosecuting
attorney: "He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty
to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one."" The conduct of the
prosecutor in the instant case was condemned on account of his use of
improper suggestions in questions, statements concerning his personal
knowledge of some of the facts, bullying of witnesses and a misleading
summation. It was not enough that the trial court had sustained objec-
tions and instructed the jury to disregard the improper questions: "the
situation was one which called for stern rebuke and repressive measures
and, perhaps, if these were not successful, for the granting of a mistrial." 4
Other federal criminal questions decided by the Court were relatively
unimportant. The Court held that in a proceeding brought to test the
removal order of a commissioner the evidence must be examined to deter-
mine "whether it was sufficient to require a finding that there was no
substantial ground for bringing the petitioner to trial on any charge
specified in the indictment.", While the commissioner was not to pass
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Cf. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 310 (1929).
2. Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78 (1935).
3. Id. at 88.
4. Id. at 85.
5. United States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligan, 55 Sup. Ct. 781 (1935).
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on controverted issues, Justice Butler declared that "Arbitrary or capri-
cious appraisal of evidence or disregard of facts indubitably established
is in legal effect failure to consider, the equivalent of the exclusion that
we have condemned, and denial of the right to be heard before removal."
Because the plain requirement of the statute had been violated a writ
of habeas corpus was granted to a petitioner who, having broken the
conditions of a suspended sentence, was taken to jail without first having
been brought before the court.7 As Justice Cardozo said, the right so
to appear consisted in this: that "he shall have a chance to say his say
before the word of his pursuers is received to his undoing. . . .The
judge is without the light whereby his discretion must be guided until a
hearing, however summary, has been given the supposed offender.""
A writ was denied which sought to set aside a conviction under one
count while petitioner was still in lawful custody under another count.
The writ had been sued out to establish petitioner's right to parole. This,
said Justice Stone, after a historical survey of the writ of habeas corpus,
was not a proper use thereof. Mandamus was suggested as an appro-
priate remedy.9 An indictment against the president of a corporation
for evading a tax by making a false return was upheld although it did
not allege that defendant was under a duty to make the return.10
While criminal prosecutions under the Prohibition Act ended with the
adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment" the government was held en-
titled thereafter to prosecute an action on a bond given to secure the
release of a vessel used in violation of that Act.12 Since the obligation
arose upon contract and the condition had been broken before the adop-
tion, the government, said Justice Cardozo, should not be penalized for
the owner's delay in compliance. The argument to the contrary would
destroy the obligation "by force of the very contingency against which
it was designed to give protection. We find no adequate reason for thus
rewarding an offender." 3 He considered the analogy of bail urged by
defendant and concluded that this became forfeited at the time of the
principal's default regardless of what thereafter occurred; subsequent
remission was but an act of grace. 4 The extent of recovery, the right
to prove innocent use, these questions were left open.
6. Id. at 783.
7. Escoe v. Erbst, 55 Sup. Ct. sis (1935).
8. Id. at 820.
9. McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131 (1934).
10. United States v. Troy, 293 U. S. 58 (1934).
11. United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217 (1934).
12. United States v. Mack, 55 Sup. Ct. 813 (1935); Comment (1935) 44 Y=u L. J. 892.
13. United States v. Black, 55 Sup. Ct. 813, 816 (1935).
14. Id. at 817, citing United States v. Kelleher, 57 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
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Insolvency
The Court considered a miscellany of bankruptcy questions. An auto-
mobile dealer, borrowing money to enable himself to buy cars, executed
both a chattel mortgage and a trust receipt in which he declared that
the car was the property of the lender and not to be sold without his
express consent. Cars were in fact sold in ordinary course of business,
notice being given to the lender afterwards and the proceeds accounted
for. After failure to account in one instance the dealer filed a petition
and was discharged. Judgment was then obtained by the lender for
conversion, but the state court had found that the conversion had not
been wilful. Therefore the Supreme Court held the claim barred by the
discharge.1" Nor was the dealer a trustee, despite the "multiplicity of
documents." Justice Cardozo pointed out that the transaction was
essentially a loan and pledge, that "a mortgagor in possession before
condition broken is not a trustee for the mortgagee within the meaning
of this statute, though he has charged himself with a duty to keep the
security intact".16
The Court resolved the question reserved in Manhattan Properties v.
Irving Trust Co.' 7 as to the effect of a clause in a lease giving the land-
lord a claim for damages on the filing of a bankruptcy petition in amount
equal to the difference between the rent and the fair rental value for the
residue of the term. Justice Roberts held in Irving Trust Company v.
Perry"8 that the claim was provable as upon an independent express con-
tract, because neither lessor nor lessee had any election, the mere filing
of the petition constituting, by its terms, a breach of the lease. The
contract was construed to mean that the present fair value of the re-
maining rent was the basis for the determination of damages, and was
15. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328 (1934); (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 540. The
BANzR'xncy ACT, § 17(4), 11 U. S. C. A. § 35 (1926), prevents the discharge of debts created
by the fraud or embezzlement of a person acting "in any fiduciary capacity." As the
Court points out in the principal decision, the statute speaks "of technical trusts, and not
those which the law implies from the contract."
16. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328, 334 (1934), citing Ten Eyck v. Craig,
62 N. Y. 406, 422 (1875).
17. 291 U. S. 320 (1934).
18. 293 U. S. 307 (1934); Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 670. The amendments of
June 7th and 18th, 1934 were not involved in this case. Under the law, as thus amended
(BANKRUPTCY ACT, § 63 [a] [7], 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 [a] (7] [Supp. 1934]) claims for
future rent may be proved. The damages, however, are limited to one year's rent after
surrender of possession, allowing, of course, any rent unpaid to the time of possession.
The Court is also given the right to scrutinize assignments of future rent claims and the
consideration paid for same.
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a reasonable formula; the contract was not, therefore, void as imposing
a penalty.
A number of problems relating to priorities were decided. A collecting
bank failed before it paid the proceeds of a check received as the result
of offsets through a local clearing house. The Supreme Court held that
having finished the business of collection the bankrupt bank was a debtor,
so the holder of the check had no claim to priority. 0 Justice Cardozo
said that in the absence of a res there could be no trust relationship:
"A debt does not furnish a continuum upon which a trust can be imposed
after cancellation or extinguishment has put the debt out of existence."20
The Bank Collection Code 2' Section 13, which expressly gives a prefer-
ence in such a case, was held inapplicable to national banks because
inconsistent with the system of equal distribution of the federal law.
The same result as the foregoing was reached where the bank failed
after it had charged a depositor with the amount of a note received for
collection and before it had remitted the proceeds. The conclusion was
not affected by knowledge of the bank and of the maker of the note that
the bank was insolvent, since the cause of action arising therefrom was
entitled to no preference.2"
In a third case the trustee of a bankrupt creditor of a bank sued to
set aside transfers as voidable preferences. Before judgment the bank
failed. The Supreme Court held the trustee not entitled to priority as
to certain items because at the time the bank received them it had a
right to do so, and even at the time the collateral was sold, no demand
had been made by the trustee for its return.2 Justice Cardozo said that
it was for these reasons impossible to trace the proceeds of the sale into
moneys mingled with the general assets (in the instant case the purchase
was not for cash, but by charging a deposit). Only as to the item for
19. Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U. S. 216 (1935); (1935) 35
COL. L. REv. 416; (1935) 23 Gao. L. J. 534; (1935) 48 HELRv. L. Rv. 1431; (1935) 83
U. or PA. L. Rav. 791; Comment (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 341. It should be borne in mind
that priorities of the character discussed in the principal case, as well as in the cases cited
in notes 22 and 23, infra are not specifically mentioned in the Bankruptcy Act. They
arise from the provision in that Act (§ 64 [7], 11 U. S. C. A. § 104 [1926]) giing priority
when the same is authorized by the laws of the states or the United States. This has been
construed to permit priority when equitable considerations, such aS the creation of an im-
plied trust, so require. Situations of this kind are sometimes spoken of not as creating
priorities but as impressing trusts and so Mr. Justice Cardozo described the situation in all
of these cases.
20. Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U. S. 216, 224 (1935).
21. IND. STAT. A-NY. (Burns, Supp. 1929) § 3861.13; NEw YoRn NEG. Lnsr. LAw
(1929) § 350 (1).
22. Old Company's Lehigh, Inc. v. Mfeeker, 294 U. S. 227 (1935).
23. Adams v. Champion, 294 U. S. 231 (1935); (1935) 35 COL. L. RE,. 930.
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which payment was received after suit by the trustee was priority
allowed by concession.
Problems with regard to the liability of distributees of deceased stock-
holders of national banks were considered in two cases. In one,24 a son
in possession of property of his father, was held not liable for an assess-
ment on bank shares registered in the father's name, because under Utah
law"' claims not asserted before the estate is closed are barred. Matteson
v. Dent20 was distinguished on the ground that the state law there under
consideration made next of kin liable for debts to the extent of property
received. In the other case, 7 because in South Carolina there was no
statute barring collection of claims asserted after administration was
completed, the inheritors were held responsible to the extent of the
property inherited.
The Court construed the Bankruptcy Law as giving to a district court
jurisdiction to try adverse title, regardless of diversity of citizenship,
but only where the defendant consents, except where the suit is one to
avoid a preference or a fraud.28  The Supreme Court declared that a
bankruptcy court had power to direct a state receiver and his attorney
to turn over moneys retained because allowed them by the state court
as fees, on the ground that the order was entered after the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy and the control of the state court had ended. 2 1
The district court has no power, since the amendment of the rules, to
permit a creditor opposing discharge time to file his specifications later
than the day when the order to show cause was returnable. The amend-
ment was especially designed, said the Court, to prevent a creditor from
getting special consideration from the bankrupt by threatening delay.
The only power remaining with the Court is that of postponing the
application and thus the time for filing. 0
The compensation of a referee was limited to the market value of
bonds extended by a composition. His claim to par value was denied
on the ground that "common sense revolts at the suggestion that creditors
have been paid for this purpose or for any other when all that has hap-
pened is that they have been left in possession of the old promises of
the debtor, reduced in amount and extended as to time."''a
24. Forrest v. Jack, 294 U. S. 158 (1935); (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 538.
25. UTAHr REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 102-9-28.
26. 176 U. S. 521 (1900).
27. Seabury v. Green, 294 U. S. 165 (1935); (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 536.
28. Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U. S. 367 (1934).
29. Taylor v. Sternberg, 293 U. S. 470 (1935).
30. Lerner v. First Wisconsin Nat. Bank, 294 U. S. 116 (1935).
31. Realty Associates Securities Corp. v. O'Connor, 295 U. S. 295, 299 (1935), per
Cardozo, J. The Court limited its decision to the peculiar facts, noting that all but an
[Vol. 4
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In Ivanhoe Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Orr 32 there was presented for the
Court's decision the question to what extent a partially paid secured
creditor could file a claim for the amount of the original debt. In this
case the obligor on a mortgage bond went bankrupt after having sold
the mortgaged premises. The mortgagee foreclosed and bought in the
property. The district court reduced the claim by the value of the prop-
erty. This determination was reversed by an unanimous Court. Justice
Roberts held that the mortgagee was not a secured creditor within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act because the property on which he held
security was not, at the time of the bankruptcy, property of the bankrupt
as specified in the law.3" Nor could the provision with regard to mutual
debts3 4 be applied, as had been done by the circuit court: "5 "A creditor
holding security who realizes upon it, does not 'owe' his debtor the
amount realized."36
Federal Income Tax
Growing divergence among the lower courts has induced the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari in many cases.37 Consequently the area of
unsettled points is gradually being narrowed. At the 1934 Term the
following questions were decided:
1. Capital gains may be considered in determining the amount of
deductible gifts to charity.38 In reaching this conclusion Justice Roberts
analyzed the statute, pointed out that the exemption of charitable gifts
was based on public policy and decided that it should be liberally con-
strued. He also referred to the re-enactment by Congress of existing
provisions while rulings of the Department favorable to the taxpayer
had been outstanding.
2. Interest paid by the government on a tax refund is taxable to a
non-resident. 39 Counsel for the taxpayer argued that the obligation to
insignificant number of the creditors were bondholders. Doubt was exprecsed whether
.the referee was entitled to any payment at all for the bonds, but, since payment on the
basis of market value was conceded, the Court passed this by. See (1935) 35 COL. L. Rv.
439; (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. REv. 913; (1935) 44 YAE L. J. 161 (discuzsing case in lower
court).
32. 295 U. S. 243 (1935).
33. 30 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93 (e) (1926); 30 STAT. 544 (1S98), 11
U. S. C. A. § 1 (23) (1926).
34. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 10 (a) (1926).
35. Ivanhoe Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Orr, 73 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
36. Ivanhoe Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Orr, 295 U. S. 243, 247 (1935).
37. Whenever the opinion states the reason for the granting of the writ appropriate
statement is made in the notes which follow. See Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of
the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933 (1934) 48 Hanv. L. REv. 238, 262-276.
38. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U. S. 144 (1934).
39. Helvering v. Stockhohns Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84 (1934).
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refund was not, within the ejusdem generis rule, similar to the "note or
bond" referred to in the statute. Justice Sutherland referred to the
express exception of bank deposits as an indication that Congress under-
stood "obligation" in its most general sense. In discussing the question
whether the United States came within the term "resident corporation"
Justice Sutherland sought refuge in legal fiction, a device appropriate,
he said, as in the tax cases, 40 when required "by the demands of con-
venience and justice." The rule of strict construction was found not
violated because the obvious intention of Congress-to collect taxes to
the fullest extent-was upheld.
3. A corporation which has in one year, because of affiliation made
two returns, may offset the loss sustained in the first year thereafter
against profits made in the second.4
4. The Statute of Limitations runs from the filing of the original
return, whether a supplementary return required by a law having retro-
active effect was filed42 or not.43
5. The Court held that the trustees of the Boston Elevated Company,
appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts, who managed the property
during a limited period of public operation, were not entitled to exemp-
tion as state officials because the federal taxing power extends to all state
activities "which constitute a departure from usual governmental func-
tions"; " the form of organization was immaterial and employees, how-
ever described or selected, were bound to pay an income tax upon. their
compensation.
6. Discount and commissions on bonds may be amortized by a cor-
poration keeping its books on an accrual basis,4' but not when the bonds
are those of an affiliate. 46
7. A corporation may not deduct contributions to charity either as
such or as an expense, unless such contributions involve a benefit to its
business or are in connection with services to its employees.47
40. See First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 328, 329 (1932).
41. Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U. S. 121 (1934).
42. National Paper Products Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 183 (1934); Clifton Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 293 U. S. 186 (1934).
43. Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 172 (1934) (in this, as well as the
other two cases cited in the previous note, cerliorari was granted because of conflicting
decisions of circuit courts); (1935) 48 HARv. L. Rav. 858.
44. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934); (1935) 35 COs.. L. Rrv. 301.
45. Helvering v. Union Pac. R. Co., 293 U. S. 282 (1934) (certiorari granted because
of conflicts claimed to exist by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
46. Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 289 (1934); Gulf, M.
& N. R. Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 295 (1934) (Justices Butler and Roberts dissenting).
47. Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 289 (1934).
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8. Depletion on oil and gas wells must be apportioned between lessor
and lessee-the royalties paid being a proper measure of the lessor's
interest, to be deducted from the lessee's 1 The Court held without
significance the fact that the law had been amended to embody the ques-
tioned ruling of the Department; this amendment, it said, was intended
to clarify, not to change, the law.
9. The owner of land who receives a bonus for an oil or gas well in
advance of its drilling is entitled to depletion allowance even though the
well was not drilled during the year 9
10. To enable a corporation to write off investment in a subsidiary,
and indebtedness owing by it, it must prove that these items do not
duplicate losses of the subsidiary taken in the consolidated returns of
earlier years.50
11. A reorganization to result in the avoiding of taxes must fill a
business need and may not be a mere shell created to evade taxes." The
taxpayer claimed that since the forms of law had been complied with
her motive was immaterial. Justice Sutherland conceded the point but
held it inapplicable because the only purpose of the claimed reorganiza-
tion was to transfer shares to the taxpayer. To hold otherwise, he said,
"would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory
provision in question of all serious purpose" 2
12. When the circuit court has found a deficiency assessment erron-
eous it may order a new trial before the Board of Tax Appeals, although
the taxpayer failed to prove facts from which the correct liability could
be determined.53
13. A life insurance company which has outstanding matured coupons
may not include these in its reserves for the purposes of the statutory
4% deduction 54 since they are debts, not contingencies.
14. A guardian may not deduct attorneys' fees from his ward's in-
48. Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Synd., 293 U. S. 312 (1934).
49. Herring v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 U. S. 322 (1934); (1934) 43
HARv. L. REv. 1025.
50. McLaughlin v. Pacific Lumber Co., 293 U. S. 351 (1934).
51. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935) (certiorari not having been opposed by
the government, which considered the question one of importance); Hendricks, Developments
in the Taxation of Reorganizations (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1198; id. at 965 (in lower court);
(1935) 23 Gao. L. J. 556; (1935) 4S Hv. L. REv. 852; (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. R v. S04.
52. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 470 (1935).
53. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting); (1935) 35 COL.
L. REv. 622.
54. Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Life Ins. Co., 294 U. S. 686 (1935) (certliorari granted
because of conflict between the circuit courts and the Court of Claims).
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come, though incurred on behalf of the estate, when the ward is not
engaged in business."
15. Securities sold by an estate are valued as of the date of death,
not as of the time of acquisition by decedent. 0 Justice Stone pointed
out that any other decision would include the increment accruing before
death both as part of the corpus in the estate tax return and as income
for the year in which the securities were sold. The fact that the law
had been amended to embody the questioned ruling of the Department,
the Court held no indication that its original meaning was otherwise,
since the amendment was intended to clarify, not to change, the law.
16. Profits payable to the estate of a deceased partner during a con-
tinuation period provided for in the partnership agreement, are income
when the partner had no capital invested, otherwise such profits are part
of the corpus for estate tax purposes. They can not be taxed in both
categories.57 The executors paid an estate ,tax on the profits earned in
the continuation period at the insistence of the Commissioner. After-
wards he insisted that the same profits should have been reported as
income by the testator. The executors sued for the return of the income
tax, or in the alternative, for the return of the overpayment of the estate
tax. The Court of Claims ruled that the income tax had been properly
assessed and refused to pass on the estate tax question because the period
of limitations had expired within which the taxpayer might have recov-
ered that payment."8 The Supreme Court determined that the estate
tax had been improperly assessed; it overcame the procedural obstacle
by ingenious reasoning. 9 Justice Roberts pointed out that where capital
is invested in a partnership the transaction between the survivors and the
executors of a deceased partner is a sale by the latter to the former of
the deceased partner's share, which would include, as part of the corpus,
any profits of a continuation period. In such case the profits were
55. Van Wart v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 U. S. 112 (1935).
56. Hartley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 U. S. 216 (1935) (certiorari
granted to resolve conflicts between circuit courts and the Court of Claims).
57. Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935) (certiorari granted because of the novelty
and importance of the question presented).
58. Bull v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 141 (Ct. of Claims 1934).
59. Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935). On the theory that If the government
had sued to recover the income tax the taxpayer could have obtained credit for the over-
payment of the estate tax, notwithstanding the Statute of Limitations, citing Williams v.
Neely, 134 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904) and cases from the states. The taxpayer should
not be penalized, said Justice Roberts, because administrative procedure required the tax-
payer to pay the tax without being sued. So, by subtle reasoning, the suit in the Court
of Claims was treated as though it were an offset, as in another case an equitable defense
had been treated as though it were a bill for an injunction so as to justify an appeal. See
Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379 (1935).
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taxable as income to the surviving partners only. Where there is no
capital there is no "sale"; consequently the profits paid are income to
the estate. An attempt to justify the inclusion of the same item in both
taxes was made by the Commissioner on the theory that under the
Income Tax Law there was taxed a right to receive, and under the Estate
Tax Law, the actual receipt. This was concededly proper in the instant
case as to the undistributed income for the period prior to death, income
which might have been spent by decedent during his lifetime and so
taken out of the category of the estate tax. The Court concluded that
as to the profits earned after death there was no distinction possible
between the right to receive and the actual receipt, and that the Com-
missioner was attempting to tax twice "the identical money." The right
to earn money in the future could not be deemed capital to the living
partner; it could not, therefore, be capital to his estate.
17. A person who at different times has purchased lots of the same
stock may select which of these lots to apply to a particular sale, even
though he is unable to identify any particular certificate of stock because
the stock is being carried for him by brokers and the certificates are all
in street names, if at the time of sale he has communicated his intention
to the brokers,"0 but not if he has failed to do so.61
18. Income of an Indian from investments made out of surplus profits
accumulated from his allotted and exempt homestead is taxable.0 2
Estate Tax
In Helvering v. Grinnell3 decedent had exercised a power of disposi-
tion in favor of persons who, in default of any exercise of the power
60. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935). Certiorari was granted in this and the
case cited in the next note to determine questions concerning the effect, validity and appli-
cability of the questioned regulation. Justice Stone disagreed with this doctrine, concurring
in the result only. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court because the facts
found by the Board of Tax Appeals were susceptible of an interpretation less favorable to
the taxpayer than the circuit court had supposed.
61. Snyder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 U. S. 134, 141 (1935). The
taxpayer made the further claim that only the purchases and sales of each year were to
be considered in arriving at his income on the theory'that his extensive operations constituted
a trade or business. The contention was rejected, partly because there was no sufficient proof
of the amount of time devoted to the trading, partly because it was "too well settled for
argument" that all sales must be considered, regardless of when the purchases wvere made
and that Snyder could not value earlier purchases on an inventory basis, as he was not a
"dealer." See Seely v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 323 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
62. Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes, for Sandy Fox v. Commkiaoner of In-
ternal Revenue, 55 Sup. Ct. 820 (1935).
63. 294 U. S. 153 (1935) (certiorari granted on account of conflicts between the cir-
cuits); (1935) 23 Gao. L. J. 565.
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would have received the property anyway. Since these persons had re-
nounced the right to take under the power the Supreme Court held the
property not taxable. Justice Sutherland ruled that the property had
not "passed" under the power as the statute specified . 4 He characterized
the argument of the government as involving "the obviously self-destruc-
tive conclusion that an unsuccessful attempt to effectuate a thing required
by the statute is the same as its consummation,"", and as depriving of
all meaning the crucial word "passing" of the statute00
Initerstate Carriers
There were several cases which reviewed orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The Court held void a direction that railroads
replace hand-operated reverse gear by air-operated power gear on loco-
motives, not, as urged by the carriers, for lack of power to make the
order nor because it had been initiated by the Commission at the instance
of the Railway Brotherhoods, but solely for lack of sufficient finding
that the change was necessary to avoid peril to life or limb. 7 Justice
Brandeis was of the opinion that a conclusion in the Commission's report
that, to a certain extent, the change should be made, left the essential
finding solely to inference. 8
A controversy arose between a number of roads using a joint terminal
at Kansas City pursuant to agreement, because after one of them went
bankrupt, the reorganized road rejected the contract and sought from
the I.C.C. the right to use the terminal upon payment proportioned to
use. One of the smaller users, a party to the agreement, then applied
for like relief, which was denied by the Commission because of lack of
power. An attempt by mandamus to compel it to hear the case failed
because the law was not so clear that the Court could say the Commission
was palpably wrong. 9 That no other remedy existed made no difference,
said Justice Roberts. He pointed to the careful consideration of the
64. 44 STAT. 9, 70, 71, 26 U. S. C. A. § 1094(f) (1926).
65. Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 156 (1935).
66. Matter of Lansing, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905) (cited as authority; con-
trary decisions in earlier federal cases were disapproved: Wear v. Commissioner, 65 F. [2d]
665 [C. C. A. 3d, 1933]; Lee v. Commissioner, 57 F. [2d] 399 [App. D. C. 1932]).
67. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 293 U. S. 454 (1935).
68. The report actually found that safety of employees and passengers required the In-
stallation of the power gear on new locomotives and, without any specific statement as to
safety, found that existing locomotives should be changed when next brought in for re-
pairs: one cannot avoid the feeling that the Court's decision exalts form above substance,
especially as there was evidence before the Commission justifying the conclusion.
69. United States ex tel. Chicago, Great Western R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm.,
294 U. S. 50 (1935); (1935) 35 COL. L. Rav. 600.
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matter by the Commission and the fact that some of its members had
dissented, as indication that "the matter is not beyond peradventure
clear."
The Commission rejected reduced rates proposed for coal from Indiana
to northern Illinois, not on the ground that the new rates were unreason-
able, but that they might precipitate a rate war. The Court in United
States v. Chicago M1. St. P. & P. R. Co. held this stand to be beyond
the power of the Commission, especially because it conceded that the
existing rate structure was unsound. 0 We quote Justice Cardozo: "The
point of the decision is not that present rates are sound, but that they
must be maintained, even if unsound, for fear of a rate war which might
spread beyond control. The danger is illusory. The whole situation is
subject to the power of the Commission, which may keep the changes
within bounds."7 The Commission was criticized for having approached
the problem in a piecemeal fashion. And intimations in its report that
the new rates were actually unfair and a conclusion to that effect were
alike disregarded as not sufficiently precise or clear: "We must know
what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it
is right or wrong". 72
A shipper brought suit to set aside an order of the Commission fixing
minimum rates for coal shipped from Ohio mines partly by water. While
conceding plaintiff's right to sue as a party interested, the Court upheld 3
the order as based upon a finding that the existing rate structure was
reasonable and should therefore not be disturbed by lower rates proposed
by certain carriers. Justice Roberts distinguished United States v.
Chicago M. St. P. & P. R. Co. because of the difference in record and
findings.
Another shipper complained to the Commission of a combination rate
from Canada solely on the ground that the American portion of the rate
was unreasonable and procured an order for the repayment of the excess.
Justice Butler concluded there could be no recovery in the absence of
proof that the entire rate was unreasonable, 7" that in effect the rate was
"joint" and that the shipper was not concerned with the division of such
rates between the connecting roads. 3
70. 294 U. S. 499 (1935); (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 619; Comment (1935) 48 Hnv. L. Rm'.
1382.
71. United States v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 509 (1935).
72. Id. at 511.
73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 822 (1935).
74. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sullivan, 294 U. S. 458 (1935).
75. Id. at 463, citing Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 269
U. S. 217, 234 (1925).
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In a brief memorandum the Court refused to review an order because
it was sustained by findings which were supported by adequate evidence
and the subject was within the Commission's authority.
The members of the Court divided in their review of an order dealing
with switching charges in the Chicago stockyards .77 The precise ques-
tion was whether charges for the use of pens in the yards under certain
circumstances came within the jurisdiction of the Commission or of the
Secretary of Agriculture, in whom was vested control of the yards. The
majority were of the opinion that the Commission had jurisdiction only
over transportation and had not made a sufficiently definite finding that
transportation had not ended. Justice Stone, speaking also for Justices
Brandeis and Cardozo, concluded that the Commission had jurisdiction
over all terminals78 and that the section of the Interstate Commerce Act
which forbade charges for delivery into pens70 also forbade charges for
removal therefrom.
The jurisdiction of the Commission was indirectly involved in Central
Vermont Trans. Co. v. Durnng.0 Suit was brought by a subsidiary of
the Central Vermont Railway, Inc. (itself wholly owned by the Canadian
Railway Company) to restrain the seizure of merchandise carried in its
vessels in coastwise traffic, allegedly in violation of law, because these
vessels were not American owned. The carrier claimed it was exempt
under the language of the law because the transportation was "over" a
through Canadian route approved by the Commission. This argument
was rejected by justice Stone, who construed the law as requiring trans-
portation over the entire route, not merely a domestic segment of it,
holding that any other construction would open the door to evasion and
permit foreign owned vessels to ply in coastwise traffic by the expedient
of filing through tariffs. The broad language conferring jurisdiction over
the I.C.C. was held not intended to remove the prohibition which had
been the policy of the government since 1817. The carrier challenged
the constitutionality of the statute (as amended to make it applicable
to its corporate status) as a taking of property without due process.
But the Court called it no more than a proper regulation. "There has
been no taking of petitioner's property. It established its business under
foreign domination, subject to the power of Congress to regulate it, and
76. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 784 (1935).
77. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193 (1935).
78. Id. at 205, citing Adams v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397, 409-415 (1932).
79. 24 STAT. 384 (1887), as amended by 48 STAT. 484-488 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15
(5) (1926).
80. 294 U. S. 33 (1935).
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in the face of a long established national policy to restrict such foreign
control of coastwise shipping.""'
An order of the Commissioner raising certain state freight rates on
the ground that they discriminated against interstate commerce had been
declared void, because the facts supporting the conclusions of the Com-
mission had not been embodied in its findings. 2 The state and other
shippers who had paid the higher rates thereafter sued to recover the
difference and obtained judgment for an amount in excess of rates the
lower court thought reasonable. In the meantime the Commission, upon
new evidence and new findings, again set up the same rate schedule as
was contained in its first order; this time its determination was con-
firmed.13 Then, in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Floridael the Supreme
Court by a five-to-four vote dismissed the shippers' claims for restitution.
Justice Cardozo, for the majority, concluded that claims such as these
rested on equitable principles, that the objection to the first order of
the Commission had been merely technical, and therefore the second
order could be considered as having cured the defects of the first: "Dur-
ing the years affected by the claim there existed in very truth the unjust
discrimination against interstate commerce that the earlier decision had
attempted to correct. If the processes of the law had been instantaneous
or adequate, the attempt at correction would not have missed the mark.
It was foiled through imperfections of form, through slips of procedure."83
While not declaring the rates originally established by the Commission
to have been validated by the new order, he said the Court would, be-
cause of equitable considerations, "stay its hand and leave the parties
where it finds them." The carrier, he pointed out, was entitled to con-
sideration; it had suffered in the past from the unreasonably low rates
imposed by authority of the state; unless protected by the Court the
carrier was without remedy: "A situation so unique is a summons to a
court of equity to mould its plastic remedies in adaptation to the instant
need."86
The minority, consisting of the Chief Justice and Justices Brandeis,
Stone and Roberts, considered these shippers entitled to recover the
entire excess above the rates originally fixed by the state. Justice Roberts
regarded the first order of the Commission as wholly void; therefore
the state rates were the only lawful ones obtaining during the period
81. Id. at 41.
82. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931).
83. Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1 (1934).
84. 295 U. S. 301 (1935), rev'g, 11 F. Supp. 36 (N. D. Ga. 1934) (three judge Eitting).
85. 295 U. S. 301, 311 (1935).
86. Id. at 316.
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prior to the second order and anything paid in excess was thus exacted
under cover of the illegal first order and should be repaid. He insisted
that the new order was not a mere curing of the technical defects of
the earlier one, but that it rested on new evidence relative to conditions
existing at the later time and not to those of four years earlier. justice
Roberts answered the plea made by the majority on behalf of the carrier
by pointing out that it could have instituted proceedings to attack the
lower state rates had they been confiscatory, that it had never done so
and that the court in the restitution action had no jurisdiction to pass
on such a claim. Equitable considerations, he said, were irrelevant: "If,
as must be conceded, the carrier took, under and by force of that order,
money to which it was not in law entitled, the conclusion necessarily
follows, that it must restore what was so taken. 87 The result, he main-
tained, was said to permit -"a federal court to ignore and nullify action
in a field within the state's sovereign power," namely, the fixation of
state rates.
It is difficult to comment on this decision. Undoubtedly, as was stated
by the minority, the first void order was not technically any justification
for retention of the moneys; but it is equally true that the higher rate
was justified by the facts as ultimately established. Solution depends
entirely upon the point of view. It is strange that in this case the four
conservatives took the broader view. That Justice Cardozo, of all nine
Judges the only one to have had extensive judicial service elsewhere,
should have joined them, gives added significance to their decision.
These public service decisions call attention again to the unsatisfactory
nature of court review, not only because of the great expense and the
long delay it involves, but also on account of the uncertainty of the
outcome. That after the many years of experience, orders of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission are still being set aside because they are
improper in form is, to say the least, astounding. Civilized practice
should permit the Supreme Court in cases such as these to remit the
proceedings to the Commission for the correction of its order; better
still would it be, were Congress to direct that no order of the Commis-
sion should be set aside on the ground of technical defects.
Admiralty
Admiralty, one of the more specialized federal subjects, often presents
delicate problems in conflict of jurisdiction, problems so subtle that not
infrequently a litigant, at the long and weary end of his appeal to the
Supreme Court, finds he has been all along in the wrong forum. Among
87. Id. at 329.
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the cases in admiralty recently decided few announced any new prin-
ciples, but many of them illustrate familiar principles in novel ways.
In McCrea v. United States88 the Court construed various laws ap-
plicable to seamen. Plaintiff claimed he was entitled to additional
wages 9 because the master had failed to divide the ship's crew into three
watches, and to double pay 0 because he had refused to pay him upon
arrival in London. The Supreme Court denied both claims, the first
because the law9" requires a seaman on arrival in a foreign port to have
his claim certified by the consul there, and the consul in London had
refused to certify for this plaintiff; the second, because plaintiff had
failed to keep an appointment with the master to discuss his claim and
had then left the ship. There could be no claim to double pay unless
the refusal to pay was "in some sense arbitrary, wilful or unreasonable."
Two damage claims by shippers were adjudicated in their favor. The
first 2 related to onions shipped from Spain which decayed because of
lack of ventilation. To some extent this had happened on account of bad
weather, a cause, which, under the bill of lading, excused the vessel;
partly it was due to failure on the part of the crew to open hatches in
good weather at night. The proof presented left it impossible to deter-
mine how much of the damage was due to the latter cause. The question,
therefore, was, on whom lay the burden of proof? The Supreme Court
placed this on the shipowner on grounds of general policy. He was
liable for the whole damage sustained, said Justice Stone, because he
was unable to show that the dangers of the sea had caused the loss or
any specific part of it. In the other case9 3 which involved cherries
shipped from Italy, there was no dispute about the damages-part of
the cargo had been destroyed. But the shipowner claimed the cargo-
owner was entitled to no damages, because the value of the cargo when
delivered exceeded the value stated in the bill of lading, plus the freight,
and there was a provision in the contract which exempted the vessel in
such event.9" Justice Roberts held a provision such as this void as
88. 294 U. S. 23 (1935), rearg. denied, id. at 382 (1935).
89. Under 23 STAT. 54 (1884), as amended by 30 STAT. 760 (1898), 46 U. S. C. A. § 6S5
(1926).
90. Under 30 STAT. 756 (189s), as amended by 38 STAT. 1164 (1915), 46 U. S. C. A.
§ 596 (1926).
91. 23 STAT. 54 (1884), as amended by 30 STAT. 760 (1898), 46 U. S. C. A. § 685 (1926).
92. Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U. S. 296 (1934).
93. The Ansaldo San Giorgio I v. Rheinstron Bros. Co., 294 U. S. 494 (1935); (1935)
35 CoL. L. REv. 602; (1935) 23 G-o. L. J. 871.
94. The contract required that the damage be determined on the basis of the value of
the "entire" shipment; it was the inclusion of this word which led to the interpretation
deemed objectionable.
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against public policy because it relieved a carrier from the consequences
of its own negligence. 5 He pointed out that the clause was neither a
true limitation agreement, which fixes the maximum value recoverable
and which is valid provided the shipper has the choice of a contract
without limitation on paying a higher rate 0 nor a true valuation clause,
which permits valuation as of the time and place of shipment, and the
validity of which remains in doubt."
A strange situation arose in Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco.8
The defendant ship collided with the Toluma; both vessels were at fault.
Owners of cargo shipped on the Toluma, on account of a "Jason" clause
in their bills of lading,99 were required to contribute to the owners of
that ship, by way of "general average," part of the cost of the repairs
occasioned by the collision. They then sued the Sucarseco for the
damage sustained by their property, including the amount of this general
average. As the entire loss, including damage to cargo, was to be shared
equally by both ships,100 it made no difference to the defendant whether
the general average paid by the cargo-owners was recovered by them or
was claimed by the other ship; the total would be the same in either
event, and its one half share the same. Therefore the defendant in no
way objected. The Toluma did object, on the theory that the general
average payments by the cargo-owners were not payments due to loss of,
or damage to, the cargo. The motive for the objection was, of course,
that the Toluma would have to give back half of the general average it
had received. The Court held that since the innocent cargo-owner could
recover from the non-carrying vessel all damages sustained by the col-
lision,1°1 the general average payment must be included, since it was due
to the collision. The Chief Justice commented: "We have the anomalous
95. The Ansaldo San Giorgio I v. Rheinstron Bros. Co., 294 U. S. 494, 496 (1935),
citing New York R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357, 384 (1873); Boston & M. R. Co. v.
Piper, 246 U. S. 439 (1918).
96. Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331 (1884); see Union Pac. R. R. Co. v.
Burke, 255 U. S. 317, 321 (1921).
97. See cases cited by lower court, The Ansaldo San Giorgio I, 3 F. Supp. 579, 581
(S. D. N. Y. 1933).
98. 294 U. S. 394 (1935).
99. This clause in substance requires cargo-owners to share with the shipowner any
losses sustained from a disaster resulting from negligence in navigation, from latent defects
or from any unseaworthiness not discovered by the exercise of due diligence. It takes its
name from the case which first upheld it, The Jason, 225 U. S. 32 (1912). The Court
there held that the Harter Act, 27 STAT. 445, 46 U. S. C. A. § 192 (1926), had relieved a
diligent owner from liability for a negligent crew and had thus opened a way to agree-
ments to limiting liability.
100. The North Star, 106 U. S. 17 (1882); The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540 (1899).
101. The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302 (1876).
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situation that it is Toluma that is opposing the cargo owners' claim
against Sucarseco, while Toluma has collected from cargo its share of
the general average expenses on the ground that they were incurred on
cargo's behalf and were due to the collision. ' 102
Two cases decided on the last day of the term illustrate the difficulties
of determining whether jurisdiction lies in admiralty or with the states.
In the one a longshoreman, working on a vessel, was hit by a crane and
thrown to the wharf; in the other, a passenger was injured by a fall to
the dock as she was stepping off the gangway. The longshoreman's claim
for compensation under a state law was upheld at the trial but dismissed
by the state appellate court on the ground that his claim was in ad-
miralty; 0 3 the passenger's suit was dismissed on the ground that her
injury had been sustained on the land. 0 4 The United States Supreme
Court unanimously held that both cases were subject to admiralty juris-
diction. As to the longshoreman this was so, said the Chief Justice,
because the injury was due to a blow received while on the vessel from
the swinging crane.' He called attention to a decision in a converse
situation: while on the dock a longshoreman was hit by cargo being
lowered from the vessel and was thrown into the water; that was an
injury arising on land. 00 In the case of the female passenger the Chief
Justice said: "The basic fact in the instant case is that the gang-plank
was part of the vessel. 107
Patents and Copyrights
In this field of the law the decisions of the Court dealt mostly with
narrow points. The cases covered a wide range of subjects: the incuba-
tion of eggs;' 08 excavating machinery;"' combined sound and picture
films; 9 improvements in phonographic sound reproduction;"' a needle
for repairing knitted fabrics." 2
102. Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U. S. 394, 405 (1935).
103. Mfinnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 269 Mich. 295, 257 N. W. 831 (1934).
104. The Admiral Peoples, 73 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
105. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 294 U. S. 704 (1935).
106. T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179 (1928).
107. Kenward v. The Admiral Peoples, 55 Sup. Ct. 885 (1935).
108. Smith v. Snow, 294 U. S. 1 (1935); Waxham v. Smith, 294 U. S. 20 (1935).
109. Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng. Corp., 294 U. S. 42 (1935).
110. Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U. S. 464 (1935).
111. Altoona Publix Theatres v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U. S. 477 (1935) (in
this and the preceding case patents held by Fox were declared invalid; see N. Y. Times,
March 5, 1935, at 14).
112. Stelos Co. v. Hosiery Motor Mend Co., 295 U. S. 237 (1935). This was the case
in which a presentable young woman showed the working of the patent in Court (see
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These cases were decided on familiar lines, either the principle that
the patent failed to disclose the real invention, as in the needle case,
or that the novelty of the device consisted of the application of mechan-
ical skill rather than of invention, as in the excavator and film cases,
In the film cases' 13 it was argued that the success of the device was
proof of its inventive quality. The Court pointed out that this was true
only when an old and recognized want was satisfied,"14 not, as here, when
the commercial demand and the new device were practically born
together.
Only the egg patent was held valid and infringed. Justice Stone re-
viewed the history of incubation. He pointed out that it had been known
to the Egyptians and the Chinese two thousand years ago, but that until
Samuel B. Smith made his particular invention it had never been possible
artificially to incubate eggs by a continuous, convenient and economical
process. Of the validity of his patent there was no question; the problem
was whether it had been infringed. The essential element of the patent
was the introduction of air mechanically circulated into a box containing
eggs in different stages of development; defendant's machine differed
from Smith's only in that here the eggs were not arranged in any par-
ticular order. This fact, said the Court, was immaterial; Smith's patent
did not require a particular order, his invention was broad, "its com-
mercial and practical success are such as to entitle the inventor to broad
claims and to a liberal construction of those which he has made.""'
The Court accordingly affirmed one decision in Smith's favor 10 and
reversed one which had been adverse. 117
The single copyright case grew out of a story published in The
American Mercury which was turned into an article and published in
the Boston Post. Plaintiff was unable to prove actual damage and the
publisher and author of the article proved their good faith. The circuit
court reduced to $250 the award of $5,000 made by the trial judge.1 18
The Supreme Court held"" that the discretion of the trial court could
not be reviewed on appeal, since he had not awarded more than the
N. Y. Times, April 5, 1935, at 1), her picturesque efforts doing her side no good. The
opinion of Justice Roberts contains a learned and solemn description of knitting, of ladders
in silk stockings and the methods available for their repair.
113. See notes 110 and 111, supra.
114. See Potts & Co. v. Creager, 155 U. S. 597 (1895); Smith v. Snow, 294 U. S. 1
(1935).
115. Id. at 14.
116. Waxham v. Smith, 70 F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
117. Snow v. Smith, 70 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
118. Cunningham v. Douglas, 72 F. (2d) 536 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
119. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207 (1935).
[Vol. 4
1935] OPINIONS OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 435
statute provided for cases in which no damage could be proved. 20 Jus-
tice Roberts said that in view of the language of the statute there was
no right to review for abuse of discretion.
The Court decided that a suit could not be continued when different
people owned the right to the. patent and the claim against the defendant,
a receiver of the original plaintiff having been appointed who sold the
claim but kept the patent.' In consequence a review on the merits
of an adverse decision of the circuit court'2 was lost.
Indianzs"-
As the result of a surveyor's error lands belonging to the Creek Nation
were allotted by the United States to other Indians and to settlers. There
was no question about the government's liability; the problem was the
date as of which the lands were to be valued. The Indians sought the
value as of the time suit was brought in 1926, the government insisted
the value should be taken either as of the time the error was committed
in 1873, or when the lands were sold in 1891. The Court of Claims
accepted the plaintiff's contention. 4 The Supreme Court, after dis-
posing of certain technical arguments made by the government, contended
that the wrong had been done in 1891, that &ie value of the lands at
that time constituted the basis for recovery, but that there should be
added such sum "as may be required to produce the present full equiva-
lent of that value," in other words interest at a reasonable rate, or, under
the circumstances, five per cent.1 -5
In another case a Creek Indian sued to recover an interest in land
which had been sold by a guardian appointed on the ground that he was
incompetent. He claimed the guardianship was invalid and that the sale
violated federal law. Defendant set up the state Statute of Limitations
and won. The Supreme Court 16 refused to pass upon the validity of
the guardianship proceedings, as that was wholly a question of state law;
it ruled against the claim that the sale violated federal law, because it
had been approved by a court, as required by that law and as decided
120. 35 STAT. 1051 (1909), as amended by 37 STAT. 489 (1912), 17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (b)
(1926).
121. Peters Patent Corp. v. Bates & Klinke, Inc., 59 Sup. Ct. 785 (1935).
122. Bates & Klinke, Inc. v. Peters Patent Corp., 73 F. (2d) 303 (C. C. A. 1t, 1934).
123. See note 62, supra for tax case.
124. 77 Ct. C1. 159 (1933).
125. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935).
126. Stewart v. Keyes, 55 Sup. Ct. 807 (1935), per Van Devanter, J., citing Campbell
v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 623 (1885).
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by an earlier case. 27 An Act of Congress, relied upon to prevent the
bar of the state statute from being effective, 128 was held unconstitutional
as "an attempt arbitrarily to take property from one having a perfect
title and to subject it to an extinguished claim of another."' 20
Veterans
War Risk Insurance was the subject of four opinions of the last term.
One case involved the distribution of moneys received after the death
of the assured and both beneficiaries. The Supreme Court held that
benefits due during the insured's life and after the death of the benefi-
ciaries belong to the estate of the insured; those due during the lifetime
of the beneficiaries belonged to their estates.8 0 In another case the
question was whether the insured had become wholly and permanently
disabled while the policy was in force. He so testified, and supported
his own statement by the opinions of medical experts; the jury believed
him. The government contended that his statement could not be so,
since he was found fit for service as an air pilot after the policy lapsed
and worked for nearly eight years in various capacities. Justice Butler
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to permit submission to a
jury; a verdict should have been directed for the government. He ruled
also that the experts should not have been allowed to express an opinion
on the issue which was for the jury to determine. 81
An unfortunate situation is disclosed by Wilber Nat. Bank v. United
States. 32  A $5,000 policy was reinstated on July 1st under circum-
stances which required a further premium payment of $1.30 in September
and $3.95 monthly thereafter. Payments were made in November and
December, after the assured had become disabled, but no payment was
made in October. The assured died in December. The Court held that
the policy had lapsed, that nothing had been done by the War Risk
Bureau which might have misled the assured, and that the acceptance
of the last two payments did not revive the policy, since the assured'
condition at the time precluded reinstatement. The Court therefore
passed by the problem whether the government was bound by the rules
of estoppel applicable to private insurance companies.
127. Harris v. Bell, 254 U. S. 103, 112, 113 (1920).
128. 44 STAT. 239 (1926).
129. Stewart v. Keyes, 55 Sup. Ct. 807, 813 (1935).
130. McCullough v. Smith, 293 U. S. 228 (1934), following Singleton v. Cheek, 284
U. S. 493 (1932).
131. United States v. Spaulding, 293 U. S. 498 (1935).
132. 294 U. S. 120 (1935).
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The fourth case presented an attempt to revive a policy twelve years
after it had lapsed, on the ground that a recent regulation made by the
Director of the Bureau established for the assured the status of being
disabled. The Court rejected the contention,"' holding that the regula-
tion was inapplicable and invalid; inapplicable, because it was not in-
tended to revive policies already lapsed, invalid, because it defined dis-
ability in terms not permitted by the statute. 34 On the facts the Court
ruled that disability had not been established, because plaintiff had been
able to find work as a salesman but had made no effort to fit himself
for that work; the long delay in bringing suit was cited against him.
Original Jurisdiction
Two suits between states were decided: Nebraska v. Wyoming"' and
Wisconsin v. Mickiga7i' 36 and both, of course, original suits filed with
the Supreme Court. The first had to do with water rights in the North
Platte River; the second, with fishing rights in Green Bay. The latter
is a boundary case; the former not. The Court did not pass on the
merits of the water dispute, but considered only a motion to dismiss
based on the absence from the suit of parties said to be necessary: the
State of Colorado, because the river originated there; the Secretary of
the Interior, because he had constructed reservoirs in Wyoming. The
Court ruled that neither party was essential; Colorado was not because
no relief had been asked against it; the Secretary of the Interior was
not because whatever rights he might acquire would be derived from the
state so that a judgment against the state would be as binding on him
as on residents of the state. The Court ruled also that the bill set forth
a cause of action. Considering the fishing rights, it determined that
justice would be done by an equal division of the waters of the bay,
rather than by the division usual in cases of navigable waters, that along
the main channel or the "thalweg". 137
Three suits were filed by the government against states. The most
interesting one involved the government's right to erect the Parker Dam
on the Colorado River in Arizona. This dam had been planned by the
Hoover administration; it was continued as one of the projects of the
New Deal. The state called out its troops to stop the work. Suit was
133. Miller v. United States, 294 U. S. 435 (1935), following Lumbra v. United Statez,
290 U. S. 551 (1934).
134. The ruling was that loss of an arm and an eye constituted disability; this was
proper as to compensation, not as to insurance.
135. 295 U. S. 40 (1935).
136. 55 Sup. Ct. 786 (1935).
137. Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U. S. 1, 7 (1893).
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then filed in the Supreme Court for an injunction. The Court dismissed
the complaint 138 on the ground that the erection of the dam had never
been authorized by law. Justice Butler pointed out that Congress had
forbidden the erection of dams on navigable rivers without its consent; 13D
he held that the prohibition applied as well to federal officials as to
private persons; he could find no legislation approving the erection of
this dam. He called attention, further, to the statutory requirement that
no reclamation project such as this could be commenced without direct
Presidential approval, 140 and ruled that the Executive Order relied on
by the government was not the equivalent of such approval, partly be-
cause the contract for the erection of the dam had been executed before
the adoption of the law under which the order was issued, partly because
the President had not specifically referred to this project even in the
order. Moreover, the NIRA required recommendation by the Chief of
Engineers. This had not been given until long after the work was started,
and was insufficient because not in the manner specified by numerous
Rivers and Harbor Acts, namely, by a report to Congress based upon
examinations and surveys made by the Engineer.
In United States v. Oregon'4' the lands involved lay within a hundred
mile long meander-line running through several lakes and their connect-
ing waters. (A meander line marks the mean high water mark.) At
the time of the admission of Oregon to the Union in 1859 this land was
all part of the public domain and it has never been included in any grant
made by the United States. Since 1908 it has been set aside as a bird
reserve, known as the Lake Malheur Reservation. Oregon claimed title
on the ground that the waters were navigable and because the title went
with the uplands granted in part to private persons, in part to the state.
It was conceded that if the waters were navigable title had vested in
the state upon admission as an incident of its sovereignty. 4" The master
found the waters non-navigable; his findings.were accepted by the Court
after a thorough review of the evidence. Justice Stone pointed out that
boats were seldom used, that trappers generally waded, that the few
motor boats employed often got stuck, and that in many cases which
had come up the state courts had declared the waters non-navigable.
The Court ruled that even if title vested in the private owners of the
uplands, possession had for so long been enjoyed by the United States
that it had the right to bring a suit to determine whether the state had
138. United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174 (1935).
139. 30 STAT. 1151 (1899), 33 U. S. C. A. § 401 (1926).
140. 36 STAT. 836 (1910), 43 U. S. C. A. § 413 (1926).
141. 295 U. S. 1 (1935).
142. See United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64 (1931).
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title. The further claim of the state, that its own laws vested it with
title to land between high and low water mark of all private land granted
to upland owners 43 was rejected 9n the ground that title to lands of the
United States could not be affected by state laws without the consent of
the government. Here, said Justice Stone, was no basis for implying
any intention to convey title to the state. The contentions of the gov-
ernment were, except as to certain minor particulars, sustained.
In United States v. West Virginit'M the government attempted in an
original suit to enjoin the state and private corporations from construct-
ing the proposed Hawks Nest Dam on the ground that it would obstruct
interstate commerce. The Court decided that no case had been made
out against the state, since it had done no more than issue a permit for
the erection of the dam, and that the original jurisdiction conferred by
the Constitution does not include suits against private persons alone.
Since, therefore, no controversy with the state existed, the action could
not be maintained. Justice Stone pointed out that there was merely a
difference of opinion as to the navigability of the river, without any actual
interference by state authority with rights claimed by the United States:
"Until the right asserted is threatened with invasion by acts of the state,
which serve both to define the controversy and to establish its existence
in the judicial sense, there is no question presented which is justiciable
by a federal court.' 4  Cases were distinguished"' in which the claim
of adverse interest related to specific property. Justice Stone added
that the Declaratory Judgment Act 4 7 gave no greater rights, for it was
not applicable unless an actual controversy existed.' Justice Brandeis
dissented, solely. because he believed the government should have an
opportunity of amending its bill.
National Banks'40
The Court held that a national bank was prohibited by law from agree-
ing to repurchase securities it had sold.V 0 The words of the statute
143. ORE. CODE A= . (1930) § 60-703.
144. 55 Sup. Ct. 789 (1935).
145. Id. at 793.
146. Such as United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1 (1935).
147. 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (Supp. 1934).
148. See Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933); BoncnAnr, Tim
DEcLARATORY JuDGmENT (1935) 29-50, 271-303.
149. For insolvency problems see page 418.
150. Awotin v. Atlas Exch. Nat. Bank, 295 U. S. 209 (1935); Kimen v. Atlas Exch.
Nat. Bank, 295 U. S. 215 (1935). The cases present in somewhat different form the prob-
lem which has recently arisen when a bank has pledged as-sets in order to obtain a deposit.
See City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262 (1934); State Bank of Commerce v. Stone,
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limited the banks to "buying and selling without recourse.""'1  justice
Stone ruled that the law was intended to protect depositors from losses
resulting from depreciation in securities which had been sold by reason
of some agreement either of guaranty or of repurchase; this meaning
was reasonable because as applied to bonds, the restricted meaning, that
of endorsement, would be wholly inapplicable. The Court held that
estoppel could create no obligation where the law forbade one and that
the law also prohibited suit to recover the price paid as for failure of
consideration: "The prohibition would be nullified and the evil sought
to be avoided would persist, if, notwithstanding the illegality of the con-
tract to repurchase, the buyer, upon tender of the bonds, could recover
all that he had paid for them."
M5 2
Arbitration
Ever since compulsory arbitration has become possible in the United
States153 doubt has been expressed about the right of a court to compel
arbitration when the agreement provided for arbitration in a different
jurisdiction."5 4 And, as a corollary, courts have differed as to their right
nevertheless to stay an action brought in violation of an agreement con-
taining such an arbitration clause.1 5 The Supreme Court has now held
that, at least in the federal system, such stay is properly granted.60
Justice Brandeis maintained also that an order denying a stay was suffi-
ciently like an order denying an injunction to be appealable under the
Judicial Code; 157 a question which had to be considered although not
raised by counsel. He said as to the merits: "there is no reason to imply
that the power to grant a stay is conditioned upon the existence of power
261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750 (1933); Hellawell v. Town of Hempstead, 10 F. Supp. 771
(E. D. N. Y. 1935).
151. 44 STAT. 1226, 12 U. S. C. A. § 24 (7) (1927).
152. 295 U. S. 209, 214 (1935).
153. See Fraenkel, The New York Arbitration Law (1932) 32 COL. L. RFV. 623; Fraenkel,
Procedural Aspects of Arbitration (1934) 83 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 226, 227.
154. See Fraenkel, The New York Arbitration Law (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 623, 631;
Fraenkel, Procedural Aspects of Arbitration (1934) 83 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 226, 232, n. 38;
Phillips, Arbitration and Conflicts of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Compulsion (1934)
19 ComN. L. Q. 197, 218-222.
155. See Fraenkel, The New York Arbitration Law (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 623, 631;
Fraenkel, Procedural Aspects of Arbitration (1934) 83 U. or PA. L. Rv. 226, 232; Phillips,
loc. cit. supra, note 154.
156. Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 293 U. S. 449 (1935).
157. 43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 227 (1926).
[Vol. 4
1935] OPINIONS OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 441
to compel arbitration." 5 s Delay in demanding arbitration was found
no bar on the grounds set forth in the opinion below.'
But the Court refused to apply the rule as to appealability to an
admiralty action; injunctions are no part of that court's ordinary pro-
cess. Hence the stay was deemed a non-appealable interlocutory order
of the usual kind, reviewable only after final judgment.1 60 This decision,
while doubtless correct on technical grounds, is on practical grounds very
unfortunate. There is no reason why any distinction should exist be-
tween arbitrations in admiralty and arbitrations in other fields. In both
it is desirable that the parties know whether the issues are to be arbi-
trated or tried; in both it would be unfortunate for them to have to go
through with a trial when stay has been refused, or with an arbitration
when it has been granted, only to find out after years of litigation that
the claim must be determined by the other method. Congress should,
therefore, enact the necessary legislation to permit appeals in all cases
from orders granting or denying stays in connection with demands for
arbitration, as also, of course, from the orders granting or refusing to
grant the application to compel arbitration.
Injured Workers' Rights
A number of cases indicate a liberal attitude on the part of the Supreme
Court in interpreting compensation and similar statutes affecting em-
ployees. Warner v. Goltra'0' involved the interpretation of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920;162 the Court held that the master of a river tug-boat
came within the definition of "seaman", and that therefore his admin-
istrator could recover damages for his death. Justice Cardozo pointed
out that the statute was designed to abolish the old illiberal law which
limited actions for damages at sea to unseaworthiness or defects in equip-
ment, that the benefit had been extended to stevedores"a and should be
further extended to include all who work on ships: "An ancient evil was
to be uprooted, and uprooted altogether. It was not to be left with
fibres still clinging to the soil."'0 4 The provisions of law0 5 relied on by
the state court 68 were held inapplicable, partly because not intended to
158. Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 293 U. S. 449, 453 (1935).
159. Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 70 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (that there
had been no earlier necessity).
160. Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg American Line, 294 U. S. 454 (1935)
161. 293 U. S. 155 (1934); (1935) 23 G.o. L. J. 336.
162. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 688 (1926).
163. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 52 (1926).
164. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U. S. 155, 159 (1934).
165. 38 STAT. 116S (1915), 46 U. S. C. A. § 713 (1926).
166. Warner v. Goltra, 334 Mo. 396, 67 S. W. (2d) 47 (1933).
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be restrictive, partly because not originally related to the Merchant
Marine Act. The compilers of the Code, by juxtaposition of sections,
could accomplish no changes in the law. A brakeman fell because, in
order to release a hand brake, he exerted pressure with his foot on a
grabiron, or handhold, which pulled away from the car. Although the
proof showed the grabiron was defective, both lower courts held for the
railroad on the ground that the iron was not intended for the use to
which it had been put. 67 Justice Brandeis reversed, holding that there
was evidence from which the jury might have found that the use put
did not subject the iron to a greater strain than should, for its intended
uses, have been anticipated.0 8
A question arose under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act'6 on account of a provision in it that the employer
obtains the right to sue the wrongdoer when the person entitled to take
compensation elects to do so. In Doleman v. Levine170 two persons were
so entitled, one elected to take compensation, the other to sue for damages
as administrator; the employer also sued under the statutory assignment.
The Court held that the employer could sue only when all the persons
entitled to do so elected to take compensation, 171 that otherwise he could
only share in such recovery as might be had by the administrator. 12
Miscellaneous Statutes
A variation of the old problem concerning interstate commerce was
presented by the publisher of an Indiana farm paper. He claimed that
a number of other publishers had conspired to obtain a monopoly of farm
advertising and, in order to destroy competition, had agreed upon a
combination rate much lower than the aggregate separate rates. While
these papers were circulated in interstate commerce the trial judge ruled
that the business of obtaining advertising was local only."" The Circuit
Court disagreed, but concluded that the influence of defendants in the
field was not sufficiently great to justify application of the Sherman
167. Swinson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 72 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
168. Swinson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 529 (1935).
169. 44 STAT. 1424, 33 U. S. C. A. § 901 et seq. (1927).
170. 295 U. S. 221 (1935).
171. As in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U. S. 530 (1933).
172. Justice Stone called attention to similar results reached in New York, United
States F. & G. Co. v. Graham & N. Co., 254 N. Y. 50, 171 N. E. 903 (1930); Zirpola v.
T. & E. Casselman, 237 N. Y. 367, 143 N. E. 222 (1924).
173. Relying on Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U. S. 436 (1920) (Court
ruled against jurisdiction because it found that the circulation of the papers did not depend
upon the obtaining of the advertising involved).
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Act.174 And Justice Butler held that both courts were wrong, the lower,
because advertising constituted an essential element of the business, the
higher court, because it had not limited its consideration to the section
of the country affected by the conspiracy 7 5
The Court held 176 that federal land banks, although performing gov-
ernmental functions,' 77 were subject to attachment and execution in state
courts because, by express provision of the law creating them, they were
subject to suits as would be natural persons, 78 and there was no excep-
tion as in other laws.7 9
The government declared void certain mining claims on the ground
that the annual work required by law had not been performed by the
operators. The Court held"'0 that this failure worked no forfeiture but
merely gave the government the right to institute proceedings of reloca-
tion while the default continued;" 1 and that there was nothing in the
new policy inaugurated by the Leasing Act of 1920182 which affected
claims previously established and thereafter maintained in compliance
with law; resumption of work constituted such maintenance.
In a suit between private parties the Court was called upon to deter-
mine whether a homestead patent carried with it riparian rights and if
so, whether a state could, in the interest of the general welfare, modify
the privilege. The lower courts had answered both questions in the
affirmative;1 s the Supreme Court in California Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland C. Co.8' affirmed the result, but since it took the oppo-
site view as to the first question it refrained from considering the second.
The decision rested upon the interpretation of various acts of Congress,
especially the Desert Land Act of 1877.185 Justice Sutherland described
as follows the conditions which led to this enactment:
"For the light which it will reflect upon the meaning and scope of that
174. Indiana Farmers' Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 70 F. (2d) 3 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1934).
175. Indiana Farmers' Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U. S. 26S (1934).
176. Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935).
177. Smith v. Kansas City Title & T. Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921).
178. 39 STAT. 363 (1916), 12 U. S. C. A. § 676 (g) (1926).
179. See FEDEa - RAimROAD Co1MOL Acr, § 10, 40 STAT. 451, 456 (1918); NAn:.'AL
BAN=NG Acr, 17 STAT. 603 (1873), 12 U. S. C. A. § 91 (1926).
180. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 55 Sup. Ct. 888 (1935).
181. Wilbur v. United States, 280 U. S. 306 (1930).
182. 41 STAT. 451 (1920), 30 U. S. C. A. § 193 (1926).
183. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F. (2d) 555
(C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
184. 295 U. S. 142 (1935).
185. 19 STAT. 377 (1877), 43 U. S. C. A. § 321 (1926).
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provision and its bearing upon the present question, it is well to pause at this
point to consider the then-existing situation with respect to land and water
rights in the states and territories named. These states and territories com-
prised the western third of the United States-a vast empire in extent, but
still sparsely settled. From a line east of the Rocky Mountains almost to the
Pacific Ocean, and from the Canadian border to the boundary of Mexico-an
area greater than that of the original thirteen states-the lands capable of
redemption, in the main, constituted a desert, impossible of agricultural use
without artificial irrigation.
"In the beginning, the task of reclaiming this area was left to the unaided
efforts of the people who found their way by painful effort to its inhospitable
solitudes. These western pioneers, emulating the spirit of so many others who
had gone before them in similar ventures, faced the difficult problem of wrest-
ing a living and creating homes from the raw elements about them, and threw
down the gage of battle to the forces of nature. With imperfect tools, they
built dams, excavated canals, constructed ditches, plowed and cultivated the
soil, and transformed dry and desolate lands into green fields and leafy orchards.
In the success of that effort, the general government itself was greatly con-
cerned-not only because, as owner, it was charged through Congress with the
duty of disposing of the lands, but because the settlement and development of
the country in which the lands lay was highly desirable.
"To these ends, prior to the summer of 1877, Congress had passed the mining
laws, the homestead and preemption laws, and finally, the Desert Land Act.
It had encouraged and assisted, by making large land grants to aid the building
of the Pacific railroads and in many other ways, the redemption of this immense
landed estate. That body thoroughly understood that an enforcement of the
common-law rule, by greatly retarding if not forbidding the diversion of waters
from their accustomed channels, would disastrously affect the policy of dividing
the public domain into small holdings and effecting their distribution among
innumerable settlers. In respect of the area embraced by the desert-land states,
with the exception of a comparatively narrow strip along the Pacific seaboard,
it had become evident to Congress, as it had to the inhabitants, that the future
growth and well-being of the entire region depended upon a complete adherence
to the rule of appropriation for a beneficial use as the exclusive criterion of
the right to the use of water. The streams and other sources of supply from
which this water must come were separated from one another by wide stretches
of parched and barren land which never could be made to produce agricultural
crops except by the transmission of water for long distances and its entire
consumption in the processes of irrigation. Necessarily, that involved the com-
plete subordination of the common-law doctrine of riparian rights to that of
appropriation. And this substitution of the rule of appropriation for that of
the common law was to have momentous consequences. It became the deter-
mining factor in the long struggle to expunge from our vocabulary the legend
'Great American Desert,' which was spread in large letters across the face of
the old maps of the far west."'8 6
186. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142, 156-
158 (1935).
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The Federal "Common Law"
The cases heretofore discussed have all involved problems essentially
federal, of either constitutional or statutory interpretation, or those in
fields exclusively committed to the central government. But the federal
courts are frequently called upon in cases involving diversity of citizen-
ship to pass upon questions which ordinarily would be left to the state
courts. Sometimes, as when interpretation of statutes is involved, the
state law is followed; s sometimes, however, there have been no state
adjudications, and the federal court must give its own interpretation.189
In some kinds of cases the federal courts feel free to develop the law
according to their own ideas.52 There has consequently grown up a
body of law in the federal system which in many respects differs from
the law of the state in which the case is brought,90  and often does not
follow the rule accepted by the majority of the states. 91' For the most
part this law develops independently of the Supreme Court, since the
Court will review on certiorari only to a limited extent;0 2 and the only
other way such cases reach it is when the circuit court of appeals certi-
fies to the Supreme Court a question for that Court to answer. 03
187. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 231 U. S. 543 (1913); Marine Nat. Each. Bank
v. Kat-Zimmens M g. Co., 293 U. S. 357 (1934).
188. See Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487, 496 (1934); Hallenbeck v. Leimert,
295 U. S. 116 (1935), discussed at p. 447, infra.
189. The rule laid down in Swift v. Tyson, 41"U. S. 1 (1842), that in matters of gen-
eral law the federal courts were free to exercise their own independent judgment has been
generally followed. See Black & White T. & T. Co. v. Brown & Yellow T. & T. Co., 276
U. S. 518, 530 (1928); Comment (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 88; Comment (1928) 77 U. or P%.
L. Rxv. 105. In that case Justice Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dissented. Justice Holmes
said (supra at p. 534): "If within the limits of the Constitution a state should declare one
of the disputed rules of general law by statute there would be no doubt of the duty of all
courts to bow, whatever their private opinions might be... I see no reason why it should
have less effect when it speaks by its other voice." (i.e., by the local courts). The extent
to which the older rule will be followed is limited by Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293
U. S. 335 (1934), discussed at p. 446, infra.
190. See Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357, 368 (1873); Hough v. Railway Co.,
100 U. S. 213, 226 (1878); Beutler v. Grand Trunk Ry., 224 U. S. 85, 88 (1912); Black
and White Taxi Co. v. Black & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U. S. 518, 530 (1928). For the
extent to which, for this reason, federal courts have been resorted to in labor cases, see
FRaw:uiR- = m GaR=-n Tnn LABoR IwuNcrIo.v (1930) 13-17; Aeolian Co. v. Fischer,
40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). See also Frankfurter, Distribution of Judidal Power
between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 Come. L. Q. 499, 524 et seq.
191. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U. S. 517 (1926).
192. Frankfurter and Hart, loc. cit. supra, note 37 (discussing the grounds on which
certiorari will be granted).
193. Even then the Supreme Court often refuses to do so, as when the question is not
sufficiently definite. Pflueger v. Sherman, 293 U. S. 55 (1934), discussed note 240, infra.
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Many cases such as these arise in connection with life insurance pol-
icies. In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson"" the policy contained a
provision waiving premium payments if the company was notified that
the insured was totally and permanently disabled. This assured died
after a default without having given the required notice; his adminis-
trator contended that the giving of notice was to be excused because of
the insured's insanity. On this question the courts of the country have
differed widely. 95 The Supreme Court was faced with the choice of
deciding the question -for itself on independent grounds or of accepting
the solution of the highest court in Virginia, where the insured had lived
and the policy had been delivered to him. The Court chose the latter
course on the ground that the contract was subject to the laws of that
state. 96 justice Cardozo pointed out that there was not involved here
any general principle of insurance law or of the law merchant which,
under earlier precedent, might have required an independent considera-
tion of the question.197  He said: "The case will not be complicated by
a consideration of our power to pursue some other course. The summum
jus of power, whatever it may be, will be subordinated at times to a
benign and prudent comity. At least in cases of uncertainty we steer
away from a collision between courts of state and nation when harmony
can be attained without the sacrifice of ends of national importance 108
Accordingly the case was sent to trial to give plaintiff an opportunity
of proving his contentions.09
Similarly, in Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. McKey 20 the Supreme
Court decided that federal courts could not refuse to enforce contracts
valid according to the law of the state in which they were made. The
Grigsby-Grunow Company had entered into an agreement for the financ-
ing of its accounts which was attacked by the circuit court2 1 as "pre-
posterous". The demand of the Finance Company for counsel fees and
194. 293 U. S. 335 (1934).
195. For a collection of cases, see id. at 338.
196. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335, 339 (1934), citing Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234 (1912).
197. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335, 339, 340 (1935), citing Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U. S. 1 (1842); Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 41 U. S. 495, 511
(1842). The principal case has been much commented upon, as a modification of Swift
v. Tyson, supra: Comment (1935) 48 HAv. L. Rxv. 979; (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. Rm.
523; Comment (1935) 44 YAr.a L. J. 113.
198. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335, 339 (1935).
199. Following Swann v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 156 Va. 852, 159 S. E. 192 (1931).
200. 294 U. S. 442 (1935).
201. P. R. Mallory & Co., Inc. v. Grigsby-Grunow Co., 72 F. (2d) 471 (C. C. A. 7th,
1934).
[Vol. 4
1935] OPINIONS OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 447
interest, which, for a short period following the appointment of equity
receivers, amounted to 28% per annum of the balance still due, that
court characterized as the "exaction of the pound of flesh". But, since
such an agreement was valid in the state in which it had been made,""-
the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Sutherland said that the courts
were concerned neither with the harshness of the contract nor with
equitable considerations, because, although the proceedings were in a
court of equity, claimant was seeking no relief peculiar to that court.
He sought no favors, but merely the enforcement of his legal rights.
The Court expressly refused to consider whether actual insolvency might
have affected differently the solution of the problem. The case was
remanded so that proof of the amount of attorney's fees and of any other
factors which might affect the extent of the recovery might be taken.
The law of a state laid down by its highest court must be applied by
the federal courts also, whenever statutory construction is involved, even
though the statute was intended merely to be declaratory of the common
law,20 3 and the law had not been settled at the time the transaction
occurred. 204 Here the question was whether bonds issued in Wisconsin
were negotiable and had been purchased in good faith. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court had interpreted the statute- °  contrary to the weight of
authority08 in such a way as to favor the holder of the bonds. Justice
Cardozo pointed out that when a statute is interpreted by the courts that
construction is read into the law as if it had always been there,071 in
contradistinction to a situation where no statute is involved. -0 3
When there has been no binding interpretation of a statute by the
state courts the federal courts may give it such meaning as they think
proper. So the Supreme Court decided in Hallenbeck v. Leivzert. "G
Checks deposited with the Ashland Bank in Chicago, drawn on the
Central Bank in the same city, were settled through the Clearing House.
Several hours later Central Bank discovered that its depositor had in-
202. Tennant v. Joerns, 329 EL1. 34, 160 N. E. 160 (1928).
203. Marine Nat. Fxch. Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Mlfg. Co., 293 U. S. 357, 363 (1934),
citing Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487 (1934).
204. Marine Nat. Exch. Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Mlfg. Co., 293 U. S. 357 (1934).
205. Pollard v. Tobin, 211 Wis. 405, 247 N. W. 453 (1933).
206. See cases cited by the Circuit Court in In re Hackett, etc., 70 F. (2d) 81S, 817
(C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
207. Brine v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627, 636 (1878).
20S. Marine Nat. Exch. Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 293 U. S. 357, 366 (1934),
citing Kuhm v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349 (1910). In that case Justices Holmes,
White and McKenna dissented on the ground that all questions of title to real estate sbould
be determined by local law.
209. 295 U. S. 116 (1935).
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sufficient funds with which to meet the checks. Under a rule of the
Clearing House it might have withdrawn the settlement before two-thirty
that afternoon; it did not do so. The lower court210 held that since the
Ashland Bank was not a member of the Clearing House it could not
benefit by its rules, and that demand made upon it by the Central Bank
early the next morning was sufficient under the Illinois Negotiable In-
struments Law.21 ' With this conclusion Justice McReynolds disagreed
on the ground that the Central Bank had irrevocably paid the checks;
that the rules of the Clearing House were pertinent in determining the
question of payment and that the Negotiable Instruments Law dealt only
with actual non-payment, not with overdrafts.
A case illustrating how the Court will apply its own view of the law
when there is involved neither interpretation of statute nor of contract,
is that of Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co.212 The insured, claiming
he was entitled to monthly payments on account of disability and that
the company had repudiated its agreement, sued to recover, in addition
to the face of the policies, the present value of the aggregate monthly
payments based upon his expectancy of life. The Supreme Court upheld
a dismissal of his complaint 22 on the ground that there had been no
repudiation. Justice Butler held there was no proof that the company's
failure to make the disability payment on which plaintiff relied was in
bad faith, but that, on the contrary, the failure grew out of its uncer-
tainty as to his condition. Even though there had been repeated refusals
to pay, followed each time by payment after investigation, the insured
had not the right to treat another such refusal as an "unqualified refusal
or declaration of inability substantially to perform according to the terms
of his obligation," such as would permit suit as for a total breach.2 14
The Court, therefore, refused to pass on the question whether the doc-
trine of anticipatory breach was at all applicable.2 15
An interesting problem in conflict of laws was presented in United
States v. Guaranty Trust Co. 210 The government sued the bank, claiming
it had improperly obtained the proceeds of a check mailed to a veteran
in Jugoslavia, since he had never received it; in other words, that the
endorsement was a forgery, by which no title passed under the law of
210. Hallenback v. Leimert, 72 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
211. ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 98, § 124.
212. 295 U. S. - (1935).
213. In 74 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). Review was granted because of conflict with
Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
214. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 14 (1900).
215. Citing Dingley v. Oler, 117 U. S. 490 (1886).
216. 293 U. S. 340 (1934); (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 544; (1935) 83 U. oF PA. L. Riv. 681.
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the District of Columbia where the check was issued and was payable.21 7
The bank contended that the validity of its title must be determined by
the law of Jugoslavia, where the endorsement was made, that under the
law of that country forgery of an endorsement does not affect the title
of a subsequent holder in due course, and that accordingly it had acquired
good title. The Supreme Court ruled that, since the check had been sent
by the government to the foreign country, the transfer of the check was
governed by the laws of that country. 21 The Court also overruled the
argument made by the government that the bank, even if it had title to
the check, could not enforce it in a manner inconsistent with the laws
of the place where it had been issued. Justice Brandeis pointed out that
enforcement violated no public policy either of the District of Columbia,
where the check had been issued, or of New York, where the suit had
been brought.219
Practice and Procedure
There remain certain cases dealing with questions of practice: juris-
diction to hear appeals in federal cases, matters of pleading, and similar
subjects, all often characterized by the term "technicalities". Frequently
reasons not apparent to the affronted layman underlie decisions so based;
often, however, the only apology the lawyers can offer for some particu-
larly harsh decision is that things have always been so, that the litigant
is suffering from the mistakes of his particular lawyer, or, when no mis-
take exists, from the lawyer's bad guess. It is high time, however, that
those technical requirements, which experience has shown tend to become
traps for the unwary, were removed. Some of the decisions made by the
Supreme Court during the term just ended bear witness that too many
still exist. Today there is an opportunity to remedy these conditions,
for the Court has taken advantage of a recent Act of CongressF 0 to
revise completely the rules of practice in the federal courts, both at law
and in equity. 21
217. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 22, § 24.
218. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U. S. 340, 346 (1934), citing Embiricos
v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [1905] 1 K. B. 677.
219. The Court also overruled other more special arguments the government advanced.
220. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (b), (c) (1934).
221. See remarks by the Chief Justice before the American Law Institute on May 9,
1935 (U. S. Law Week, May 14, 1935, at 866), followed by the appointment of a com-
mittee headed by former Attorney General Mitchell (U. S. Law Week, June 4, 1935, at
945). See Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Procedure (1935) 20 Co-. L. Q.
443; Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure (1935) 44 Y=r L. J. 387, id. at 1291.
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Federal Jurisdiction
At any stage of the case, a federal court must consider its own juris-
diction, whether asked to or not; indeed, it should do so, even if asked
not to. Acting on this principle the Supreme Court dismissed a bill in
an action for the appointment of ancillary receivers on the ground that
the parties were citizens of the same state. 2 The Court disregarded the
fact that the nominal plaintiff was a resident of a different state since the
suit had really been brought by the primary receivers, the non-resident's
name having been used because she was the plaintiff in the suit in which
the receivers had been appointed. 'Answering the argument that diversity
of citizenship was not necessary in an ancillary suit, Justice Brandeis
said that this suit was not really ancillary, since the primary receivers
had been appointed by a state court; such a suit was independent and
could be maintained only if diversity of citizenship existed. He expressed
doubt whether there might even be such a thing as an ancillary suit in
one federal district to a suit pending elsewhere. 23
Another aspect of the ancillary receiver problem resulted in a different
ruling. After his appointment, such a receiver brought suit; and his
right to do so was denied on appeal.2 4 This, said Justice Brandeis, was
not a jurisdictional question, but referred merely to the legal capacity
of the plaintiff to sue. 225 The Court refused to pass on his capacity to
sue and held that the circuit court had erred in so doing, because the issue
had not been properly raised.22 The attack on the standing of the re-
ceiver was based on the fact that no independent bill had been filed in
the district in which the ancillary receiver had been appointed. This,
said Justice Brandeis, was not the case of a receiver attempting to sue
in a district other than the one in which he had been appointed,2 7 be-
cause a "foreign" receiver acquires no title to assets in other jurisdic-
tions.22
Jurisdiction, however, is lacking, if there is stated no cause of action
222. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237 (1934).
223. Id. at 243, citing Raphael v. Trask, 194 U. S. 272, 278 (1904).
224. McCandless v. Furland, 68 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
225. McCandless v. Furland, 293 U. S. 67 (1934).
226. A mere denial of due appointment in the answer was insufficient; there should
have been in the answer a plea in abatement or a specific claim, since the defect could
have been remedied if it had been called to the attention of the plaintiff.
227. Prohibited by Booth v. Clark, 58 U. S. 322 (1854).
228. justice Brandeis, however, noted that many states now permit foreign receivers
to sue, and that when, by statute, a foreign receiver acquires title, he cannot be denied
the right to sue, citing Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934). McCandless v. Furland,
293 U. S. 67, 76 (1934).
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of which the court may take cognizance. In Spielman Motor Sales Co.
v. Dodge,2" an action was brought to enjoin the District Attorney of
New York County from enforcing the provisions of the Retail 'Motor
Code. No facts were alleged from which it was to be inferred that the
code provisions objected to were likely to cause serious interference
with plaintiff's business. Since ample opportunity for raising the consti-
tutional issues existed in the threatened criminal prosecution, there was
no reason, said the Chief Justice, for interference by equity. He held,
however, that a county official is a state officer within the meaning of
the judicial Code" when he acts to enforce a statewide policy.
In order to ascertain whether the amount involved exceeds the neces-
sary $3,000, the Court must consider plaintiff's entire interest in the
fund, not merely the amount to which he might be immediately entitled.
In Brotherhood of Locomotive E. & E. v. Pinkston,"1 a widow sued for
herself and others to preserve a pension fund. Although she was en-
titled to only $35 per month, Justice Sutherland upheld her right to sue,
because her expectancy of life was such that the present value of her
aggregate pension instalments exceeded $3,000.232  The fact that she
might lose her pension if she remarried, he held immaterial; besides,
proof had been made on the trial that this contingency also was capable
of actuarial determination, and that it did not affect the result.
Trial Practice
In suits brought upon insurance policies, defendant claimed fraudu-
lent concealment of illnesses, and sought separate trials in equity of the
issues so raised. The Chief Justice ruled that this was improper; in
one case2 33 the Court reversed an order directing such a trial; in an-
other, 4 it reversed a judgment obtained by the defendant after such a
trial. The rulings rested on the fact that the defenses were fully avail-
able to the insurance company in the actions at law. The situations were
not like those in which actions in equity were necessary to enable the
company to raise the questions of fraud before the policies became
incontestable.233
229. 295 U. S. 89 (1935).
230. 36 STAr. 1162 (1911), as amended by 43 STAT. 938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 3S0
(1926).
231. 293 U. S. 96 (1934).
232. Id. at 102, citing Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551 (1913).
233. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379 (1935).
234. Adamos v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 386 (1935).
235. Because no action had been brought on them before the time had elapsed in which
such contest might be raised, as in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S.
167, 177 (1923).
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Federal Appeals
The extent to which stay orders in arbitration proceedings are appeal-
able has already been discussed. 230  The Court held appealable as being,
in effect, an injunction, an order directing the prior trial of equitable
issues.237 As, however, the time in which an appeal may be taken from
an interlocutory order granting an injunction is less than that allowed
for appeal from a final order, it may be vital to know whether a parti-
cular decree is final or not. This question has been productive of a
great deal of litigation. In George v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,20 8
the Supreme Court reached a conclusion different from that of the cir-
cuit court. 39 In a suit brought for the infringement of the common
law right of property in the song "The Wreck of Old 97," a decree was
entered in plaintiff's favor, granting an injunction and appointing a
master to report on the profits made by defendant. The decree was
labeled as "final," and was so signed. On an appeal taken within the
longer time allowed for appeals from final judgments, the circuit court
ruled that plaintiff was estopped from now claiming that the decree
was interlocutory, and that, in fact, it was firnal. The court then reviewed
the merits and reversed. The Supreme Court directed a dismissal of
the appeal, holding the decree merely interlocutory. It discussed neither
the claim of estoppel nor the merits of the controversy. Here very sub-
stantial rights may have been lost by reliance upon appearances. Such
problems should not be allowed to exist.
Questions are often certified to the Supreme Court by the circuit courts.
They will not be entertained unless distinct and definite.2 40  Nor will the
Court, upon such a question, decide the constitutional validity of a statute,
especially when the matter is presented on motion to dismiss the com-
plaint, since the result would only delay the final determination. 21  A
seemingly pointless question was presented by certificate in E. R. Squibb
& Sons v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works: 242 if assignments of error are
236. See p. 440, supra.
237. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379 (1935).
238. 293 U. S. 377 (1934).
239. Victor Talking Machine Co. v. George, 69 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
240. Pflueger v. Sherman, 293 U. S. 55 (1934); Wilshire Oil Co. v. United States, 295
U. S. 100 (1935). In the first of these cases was involved the very technical question of
appeal from a joint decree without proper severance of non-appealing parties. See action
taken after the Supreme Court decision in 75 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935). See also
United States v. Fidelity & Dept. Co. of Baltimore, 295 U. t. - (1935); Texas Land &
Cattle Co. v. City of Fort Worth, 55 Sup. Ct. 658 (1935).
241. Wilshire Oil Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 100 (1935) (this was an attempt
to obtain a ruling on the petroleum code).
242. 293 U. S. 190 (1934). The technical requirements as to assignments of error have
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abandoned, is the judgment to be affirmed or the appeal dismissed? The
former should be the case, .said the Court, unless no proper assignments
were ever filed. And in one case the Court held that the circuit court
had erred in dismissing an appeal. 43 The defendant had procured the
removal of a case to the federal court by bringing in a nonresident party;
the federal court, at plaintiff's instance, dismissed the cross-complaint
against that party and then remanded the case to the state court. De-
fendant appealed from the dismissal, not from the order remanding,
which is not appealable. The Supreme Court directed the circuit court
to pass on the merits of the dismissal of the cross-claim, pointing out,
however, that a reversal would not affect the order of remand. Here
again form was exalted above substance, for, if the dismissal was im-
proper, then the case should have been in the federal court; yet this
cannot be accomplished in any way. On the other hand, serious obstacles
exist to permitting appeals from remand orders. Perhaps the solution
would be to permit an appeal from a remand order only when it rests
upon the decision of some other question as to which appeal is possible,
as in the instant case.
A strange result followed affirmances at the 1933 term by an evenly
divided Court 2 " when, only a few months later, the identical tax ques-
tion245 was decided the opposite way by a unanimous bench.2-4 The
government, which had lost the first cases and won the last one, then
sought reargument. This was refused 47 on the ground that the power
of the Court to grant reargument had been lost because more than thirty
days had elapsed since its mandate had issued. 48 It is, of course, essen-
tial that there be an end to every litigation; yet those were fortunate
taxpayers, who had succeeded in persuading four members of the Court
that they were right when, a few months later, all four took the oppo-
site position.
While this article has not considered rulings of the Court on applica-
tions for certiorari, there is one case to which attention should be called,
especially in view of the pending plans to reform federal procedure. A
been productive of much litigation. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U. S. 86 (1932);
Baker Ice Machine Co., Inc. v. Hebert, 76 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
243. Waco v. United States F. & G. Co., 293 U. S. 140 (1934).
244. Helvering v. Northern Coal Co., 290 U. S. 591 (1933); Hel-ering v. United States
Refractories Corp., 290 U. S. 591 (1933) (Justice Roberts not having participated).
245. Whether waivers given after the e-piration of the period of limitation were valid.
246. Helvering v. Newport Co., 291 U. S. 485 (1934).
247. Helvering v. Northern Coal Co., 293 U. S. 191 (1934).
248. By reason of Revenue Act of 1926, § 1005 (a), which makes the order of the Board
of Tax Appeals final after such period. 44 STAT. 9, 110, 111, 26 U. S. C. A. § 640 (1926).
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bank sued husband and wife on a note said to have been signed by both.
There was no proof that the wife had signed, or had authorized any one
to sign for her. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, decided for the
plaintiff. Defendant's attorney did not formally note an exception, but
he noted an appeal. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
although unanimous in holding that the bank was not entitled to recover,
affirmed the decision on the ground that, in the absence of an exception,
there was nothing to review.249  Two of the judges, on rehearing, filed
strong dissents: "The lasting humility imposed upon defendant and her
innocent children by a criminal husband and father imposes sufficient
burden upon them without adding to their total impoverishment through
his criminal act. Can it be that justice is so blind that an insignificant
technical error estops a court of justice from extending the relief here
so convincingly demanded?"--"And the denial of a review here of a
judgment acknowledged to be wrong here, because the trial court and
counsel, in a common effort to dispatch business, omitted a futile formula
of words, is to sacrifice the substance of justice to the shadow.' 2' 0 The
majority felt bound by decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that,
in a trial without a jury, there is nothing for an appellate court to review
unless there has been a motion for judgment followed by an exception;
otherwise it would be assumed that the facts justified the result.2 1 The
Supreme Court refused to hear the case.' 52  It is understandable that a
trial judge be not found in error on some matter not called to his atten-
tion. But when there is no basis at all for the decision it should not be
necessary to employ any form of words whatever to preserve the right of
appeal. It is time this particular trap were removed from federal practice.
Conclusion
Two points suggest themselves after a study of these cases: What can
be done to lessen the number of problems of statutory interpretation?
How can the consequences of some of the decisions be avoided for the
future? The first problem is largely one of legislative draftsmanship,
the second is one of reform. A solution of both might be facilitated if
there were, in the vast agglomerate of our federal government, any agency
which concerned itself with such things; Justice Cardozo's proposal of a
"Ministry of Justice"2"3 comes to mind.
249. Darby v. Montgomery County Nat. Bank, 72 F. (2d) 181 (App. D. C. 1934).
250. Id., Van Orsdel, J., at 186 and Ritz, J., at 187.
251. Fleischmann Const. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 349, 357 (1926); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Gray, 292 U. S. 332 (1934).
252. Darby v. Montgomery County Nat. Bank, 293 U. S. 579 (1934).
253. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 HARv. L. Rwv. 113, reprinted in CAuwozo,
LAW AND LrrmATunE (1931) 41 ct seq.
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In some states an approximation has been made toward the accom-
plishment of this suggestion. There are now many Judicial Councils
concerned with the improvement of the administration of the law, with
procedure and mechanics. New York has recently established a Com-
mission on Law Revision2F5 whose function it is to suggest changes in
the substantive law. The members of these bodies, however, usually
devote but a small portion of their time to their extensive tasks. Many
states also have law drafting committees supposed to control the wording
of statutes, but too often their efforts are thwarted by last minute changes
in the legislative halls.
The federal system derives some benefit from the annual conference
of judges, and at the moment there exists an advisory committee for the
purpose of creating new rules of practice. Presumably, too, the Attorney
General from time to time suggests changes in the law. But these efforts
are too haphazard, too discontinuous. What is really needed is a single
agency continuously functioning in an endeavor to simplify the law applic-
able to the federal courts in all its phases. It would be the duty of such
agency to edit proposed legislation, and to scrutinize enacted laws in
order to minimize the possibilities of misunderstanding. It would also
propose new legislation designed to correct infirmities in the law as dis-
closed by decisions.
While congressional inertia is likely to retard the adoption of most
of the suggestions made by such a body, much good would nevertheless
result from its existence. If it performs its duties conscientiously it
will provide a mass of well documented and reasoned material available
to students of legal reform and to the occasional forceful member of
Congress intent on bringing reforms to pass. That much can be accom-
plished by an energetic individual is shown by the ultimate success of
Senator Norris' long fight to abolish the "lame duck" Congress. Surely
the less spectacular, but none the less important, problem of law reform
should also find its determined champions. Much work lies ahead in
order to make our federal law a more understandable and a juster work-
ing system. It is time a concerted effort were made to commence this
task.
254. See the Judicial Council compiled by the Merchants Association of New York
(1931). New York has created such a body. NEw Yonx JuDcIARY LAw (1934) §§ 40-48.
25. NEw Yonx LEGIsLAT= L.W (1934) §§ 70-72. The purposes of this Commis-on
generally are to recommend changes in order "to modify or eliminate antiquated and in-
equitable rules of law, and to bring the law of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony
with modern conditions.' It is composed of seven members, two of whom are the re-
spective chairmen of the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committees, and the others are
appointed by the Governor with the provision that at least two of the five be law pro-
fessors and at least four of the five be attorneys.
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